Emotion regulation plays a central role in mental health and illness, but little is known about even the most basic forms of emotion regulation. To examine the acute effects of inhibiting negative and positive emotion. we asked 180 female participants to watch sad, neutral. and amusing films under I of 2 conditions. Suppression participants (N = 90) inhibited their expressive behavior while watching the films; no suppression participants (N = 90) simply watched the films. Suppression diminished expressive behavior in all 3 films and decreased amusement self-reports in sad and amusing films. Physiologically. suppression had no effect in the neutral film, but clear effects in both negative and positive emotional films. including increased sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system. On the basis of these findings, we suggest several ways emotional inhibition may influence psychological functioning.
If this view is correct, the reason that little has been done is that little can be done.
Without minimizing its complexity. we propose that emotion regulation can indeed be broken down into pieces that are amenable to empirical study. One way to do this is to study specific clinical populations. Examples of this approach include studies that examine regional lateralization of brain activity in depressed individuals (Henriques. & Davidson. 1991) or assess blunted affect in people with schizophrenia (Kring & Neale. in press) . A second, complementary approach examines aspects of emotion regulation in nonclinical populations that hwe particular relevance to clinical syndromes. Such studies both elucidate the fundamental nature of these emotional responses and help establish norms necessary for subsequent determination of whether and how these responses are altered in clinical populations. Examples of this approach can be found in work studying processes of emotional suppression (Gross & Levenson. 1993) or rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema. 1993 ) in nonclinical or subclinical populations. In this article. we take the second approach. with a particular focus on the inhibition of negative and positive emotion.
Emotional Inhibition: For Better or for Worse?
Civilization seems to require that we inhibit the free play of our emotions, and many have wondered what consequences such emotional inhibition might have (Elias. 1978; Freud, 1961; Tomkins. 1984) . Some commentators have feared for the worst. A century ago, for example, Freud argued that emotional inhibition was an important cause of psychological illness. and his talk therapy was designed to release "strangulated affect" whose expression. for one reason or ano~ had been severely curtailed (Breuer & Freud. 1957 /1895 . Despite the substan-tial changes from Freud's original theory of pathogenesis that occurred over the ensuing decades, the idea that emotional inhibition may lead to psychological distress remains a central tenet of psychodynamic psychotherapy. Accordingly, an important goal of expressive therapies continues to be the fuller expression (e.g., representation in conscious awareness; experience and expression in the context of the therapeutic relationship) of inhibited emotional responses (Alexander &: French. 1946; Brenner. 1982; Levy. 1990) .
Recently, others have cast emotional inhibition in a more positive light. arguing that this and other forms of emotion regulation represent an essential developmental milestone (Kopp. 1989; Saami, 1990; Thompson. 1991) . This view is consistent with the notion that healthy adults often IDlSt inhibit (to varying degrees) their ongoing emotion-expressive behavior (lbmkins. 1984 ) . It also accords weU with the evidence concerning the potent destructive effects of unregulated emotional responding, as in the precipitous expression of anger in intermittent explosive disorder: On this view, emotional inhibition is not uniformly pathogenic. Indeed. in many circumstances, it may be the failure of emotional inhibition that is problematic.
Obviously, there is a middle ground between these two perspectives, one that holds that there is an optimal level of emotional regulation-somewhere between total strangulation and completely unfettered expression. The point we wish to emphasize here. howev~ is the extremely important role that emotional inhibition bas J)layed historically in clinical theory.
Empirical Findings
Despite long-standing clinical interest in the topic of emotional inhibition, the relevant empirical literature is impoverished and inconsistent (for a review, see Gross &: Levenson, 1993 ) . EveJl if we limit ourselves to questions about the inhibition of emotion-expressive behavior (as opposed to the inhibition of subjective emotional experience), clear conclusions are difficult to come by. What little is known, though. suggests that inhibiting expressive behavior decreases self-reported experience oLsome emotions (e.g., pain, pride, and amlSCment) but not others ( e.g .• disgust; Bush. B~ McHugo, &: Lanzetta, 1989; Colby, Lanzetta, &: Kleck, 1977;  Gross &: Levenson, 1993 ; Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, &: Kleck, 1976 Anderson, 1987; Stepper &: Strack, 1993; Strack. Martin. &: SteP~ 1988) . Physiologically, inhibiting expressive behavior while waiting· for a painful shock leads to decreased skin conductance reactivity (Colby et al., 1977; Lanzetta et al., 1976) . but the effects of inhibiting emotional responses to other negative stimili have been mixed (Gross &: Levenson, 1993; Zuclcerman, Klorman. Larrance, &: Spiegel. 1981 ).
The Present Study
InasImch as mental health requires that we regulate powerful emotional impulses-and deficiencies in this ability are implicated in a wide variety of clinical conditions-it is unfortunate that more definitive statements about emotional inhibition cannot currently be made. Th better understand the nature and consequences of this important emotion-regulatory process, we experimentally manipulated the inhibition of emotional responding in a sample of healthy volunteers using a similar methodology to the one we used previously to study disgust (Gross &: Levenson, 1993) . This time, however, we examined both a negative emotion (sadness) and a positive emotion (aImscment), as well as a control neutral emotional state.
Our decision to study healthy participants was dictated by a desire to establish nonnative data relevant to this form of emotion regulation before engaging the compleXities of clinical samples. Our selection of target emotions was dictated by the desire to extend our previous study of the negative emotion of disgust to a more clinically relevant negative emotion (sadness), whose regulation is centrally implicated in mood disorders such as major depressive disorder: Given the theoretical importance attached to distinctions between negative and positive emotions, we also wished to include a positive emotion (aImsement) that also IDlSt at times be suppressed (e.g., to facilitate task focus).
In addition, to address the possibility that the observed pattern of findings might result from inhibiting any behavior (rather than emotional inhibition per se), we included a control condition in which participants were instructed to inhibit their expressive behavior while in a neutral emotional state.
Hypotheses
We view emotional inhibition as an active, effortful affair in which inhibitory processes are recruited and then pitted against ongoing emotional responses. This leads to the prediction that some signs of emotion may be visible even as higher order inhibitory processes are activated. In addition. if emotional inhibition requires effort, it should have physiological consequences. This leads to the prediction that participants who inhibit ongoing emotion-expressive behavior should show greater signs of physiological activation that participants who do not engage in emotional inhibition. FInally, given the marked behavioral and physiological changes we anticipated would be wrought by emotional inhibition, it seemed possible that subjective experience also might be affected. Drawing on previous research, we predicted that emotional inhibition would lead to decreased amlSCment ·self -reports.
Method Participants
One bUDdred and eighty female ~ participated in individual experimental sessions in order to fulfill a requirement of an introductory psychology course. 
Film Stimuli
Four films from a set of standardized emotional film stimuli (Gross & . Levenson, 1995) were used. The first ( 1.S min, SOUDdless) shows tlowers in a park (Ekman, Friesen, &: O'Sullivan. 1988 ) and elicits emotion reports that are similar to baseline. The second film (3.5 min, with sound) shows a comedy routine (amusement film: Morra. Bremer. & Gowen, 1986) . This film elicits emotion reports of amusement with little other emotion. The third film (3.5 min, soundless) shows a geometric display (neutral film: ScreenPeace screensaver). It elicits a relatively 2 1\\10 additional participants were tested but bad to be excluded due to equipment failure (one in each experimental condition).
neutral emotional state charactenzed by limited emotional responding. TIle fourth film (3.5 min. with sound) shows a funeral scene with a distraught mother (sadness film: Stark & Ross. 1989 ). This film elicits emotion reports of sadness with linle other emotion.
Procedure
On arrival. participants were informed that we were "interested in learning more about emotion" and that their reactions would be videotaped. Participants then watched four films. Prior to each film. participants rated their current emotional state (pre film rating) and then sat quietly for a minute (resting baseline). Participants first watched the film of flowers in a park (to accustom them to the laboratory). Participants then saw amusement. neutral. and sadness films (the order of Films 2-4 was counterbalanced. and all participants saw all three films). The instructions participants received prior to the second, third. and fourth films were determined by their random assignment to one of two conditions (no suppression. suppression). In the no-suppression condition. participants received the following instructions:
We will now be showing you a shon film clip. It is imponant to us that you watch the film clip carefully. but if you find the film too distressing. just say "stop".
In the suppression condition. participants received the following instructions:
We will now be showing you a shon film clip. It is imponant to us that you watch the film clip carefully. but if you find the film too distressing. just say "stop." This time. if you have any feelings as you watch the film clip. please try your best not to let those feelings show. In other words. as you watch the film clip. try to behave in such a way that a person watching you would not know you were feeling anything. Watch the film clip carefully. bu~ please try to behave so that someone watching you would not know that you are feeling anything at all. Each film was followed by a I-min postfilm period. After this postfilm period. participants completed a self-repon inventory to describe their emotional responses during the film.
Apparatus
Audiovisual. A color video camera placed behind ~ glass in a bookshelf was used to record participants' facial behavior'and upper body movement unobtrusively. , Self-repon. Participants rated how they felt before each filn;1 (prefilm rating) and. after viewing each film. how they had felt during the film (film rating). On each occasion. participants used a self-repon inventory consisting of 16 emotion terms (amusement. anger. arousal. confusion. contempt. contentment. disgust. embarrassment. fear, happiness. interest. pain. relief. sadness. surprise. tension) and 2 global terms (pleasantness. intensity), For the 16 emotion terms. participants rated the greatest amount of each emotion they felt using an anchored 9-point Liken scale (0 = none. 8 = most in my life) that was adapted from Ekman. Friesen. and Ancoli. 1980 . For the global terms. participants .,rated their feelings on 9-point Likert scales (-4 = extremely mild/ iunpleasant. 4 = extremely intense/pleasant).
Physiological. Continuous recordings were made using a l2-channel Grass Model 7 (Astto-Med, Inc .
• West Warwick, Rl) polygraph. Nine measures were obtained: (a) cardiac interbeat interval: (b) skin conductance level; (c) finger temperature; (d) finger pulse amplitude: (e) pulse transit time to the finger: (f) pulse transit time to the ear: (g) respiratory period: (h) respiratory depth: and (i) general somatic activity. These measures were selected so as to provide a broad index of the activity of the phYSIOlogical systems (I.e .. cardiac. vascular. somatic. respiratory. thermoregulatory) especially Imponant to emotional respondmg.
Data Reduction
The first film (flowers in a park) was included solely to accustom participants to the laboratory; data from this film were not analyzed. For the amusement. neutral. and sadness films. data reduction for behavioral data was based on the prefilm ( I min) and film (3.5 min) periods. Data reduction for physiological data was based on the pre film ( I min), instructional (1 min). and film (3.5 min) periods.
Behavior. Participants' behavioral responses were coded by four raters (2 men. 2 women) who were blind to participants' experimental conditions and to the nature of the film stimuli. Raters used a behavioral coding system that included 12 codes (Gross & Levenson. 1993 ): (al happiness: (b) sadness; (c) pleasantness: (d) intensity: (e) body movement; (f) facial movement; (g) mouth movement: (h) yawning; (i) smiling: (j) crying; (Ie) blinlcs: and (I) face touching. Three of these were frequency measures (yawning. smiling. blinlcs: these were convened to events per minute for analysis). and the rest were continuous measures whose values were determined by the intensity. duration. and frequency of response. Reliabilities (derived by considering the average correlations among all possible comparisons among the four coders) were good (mean Pearson r = .81: range. r = ,64 for sadness to r = .96 for smiling). Because each participant's behavioral responses were independently coded by two coders. final values for each of the codes were determined by averaging each of the coder's ratings for a given participant's expressive behavior: Change scores were then created for each variable by subtracting prefilm ratings from film ratings.
Physiology. For somatic activity. interbeat interval. and skin conductance level. change scores were created by subtracting pre film period scores from film period scores for each variable. Then. to reduce the total number of physiological variables in the analysis. we created on a priori grounds two additional composite variables. which were designed to assess theoretically defined patterns of activation. The first was a measure of sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system ( excluding heart rate. which is a joint function of both sympathetic and parasympathetic activation). This measure was derived by combining four unitweighted standardized change scores (pulse transit time to the finger. finger pulse amplitude. pulse transit time to the ear, and finger temperature). The second composite was a measure of respiratory activation. formed using two unit-weighted standardized change scores (respiratory period and respiratory depth).
Results
To assess the effects of emotional inhibition. we first consider , the physiological effects of simply hearing the instructions to suppress (prior to the start of the film stimulus). Next. we examine the impact of emotional suppression (after the start of the film stimulus) on participants' physiological. behavioral. and subjective emotional responses.
Instructional Period
During the instructional period. all participants knew they would soon be seeing a film (they had no way of knowing which film). and half of the participants knew they would be trying to suppress their responses to the film. During this instructional period we measured physiological responses (no self-reports were obtained and no behavioral coding was done).
To evaluate the effects of the suppression instructions during this instructional period. we simply conducted an overall 2 level multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA; Condition: sup- suppression. no suppression) for each of the five physiological variables (averaging over the three levels of emotion). As presented in Table I , compared with their no-suppression counterparts, suppression participants showed greater increases in somatic activity. greater decreases in cardiac interbeat interval (signifying faster heart rates). greater increases in skin conductance, greater relative sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system, and greater relative respiratory activation.
Film Period
During the film period. participants differed as to which instructions they received and which film they viewed. During this period. we coded expressive behavior and measured physiological responses. Subjective emotional experience was assessed . foilowing the film. Notl!. C = condition; E = emotion .
• dfs = 2, In. b Mean difference (between instructional groups within a given film) is significant at p < .05. Figure I . follow-up tests revealed that the suppression instructions had physiological consequences during the amusement and sadness films. but not during the neutral film. During the amusement film. suppression participants showed lesser somatic activity and slower heart rates. but greater sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system than nosuppression participants; mean change in somatic activity: suppression = 0.02. no suppression = 0.13. t( 148.80) = 4.92. indicating that the suppression instructions had no overall effect on participants' emotion self-reports. This was consistent with our prediction that the effects of the suppression manipulation in the self-report domain would be specific (as contrasted with the more general effects expected in the domains of behavior and physiology).
Because there was no evidence of any nnltivariate effects involving condition, we did not proceed with follow-up univariate tests for each of the 18 self-report variables. However. we did conduct specific planned comparisons to test the a priori hypotheses that suppression participants would report less amusement than no suppression participants during the artUlSement film (but not during the sadness and neutral films), and that there would be no difference in self-reported sadness be- tween instructional groups for any of the three film conditions. As presented in Figure 2 , between-groups t tests comparing change in amJsement for the suppression and no-suppression participants revealed that suppression participants reported less amJsement than no-suppression participants during the amJSement film and during the sadness film. but not during the neutral 
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Discussion
To begin to chart the consequences of one important fonn of emotion regulation. we asked participants either to suppress their behavioral responses or to respond 'naturally while in negative, neutral, or positive emotional states. In the following sections, we review our findings and offer several suggestions as to how emotional inhibition might promote-or impair-psychological functioning.
Effects of Preparing to Suppress
The initial effects of emotional inhibition were evident during the instructional period, even before participants were exposed to the emotion-eliciting stim11us. During this period, participants who were told that they would soon have to try to inhibit their emotion-expressive behavior evidenced widespread physiological activation compared with those who were not told they would need to control their reactions. These signs of greater physiological activation are most likely the autonomic and somatic concomitants of a generalized preparatory mechanism for emotion suppression. We believe this preparation can best be described as participants' "bracing" themselves in anticipation of what was to come, reflecting both their uncertainty about the upcoming emotional experience and their concern about whether they would be able to perfonn the assigned task of inhibiting all visible signs of emotion .
Effects of Suppression
We conceptualize emotions as powerful biologically based reactions that organize our responses to environmental challenges and opportunities (Levenson. 1994) . This leads to the prediction that overriding emotion response tendencies requires an active inhibitory process (Gross & Levenson, 1993) . Given the integration of behavio~ physiology, and subjective experience in emotion. we expected emotional inhibition to have important consequences for behavio~ physiology, and subjective experience.
Expressive behavior. While viewing emotional stimuli that ordinarily produce strong emotion-expressive behaviors. suppression participants were able to decrease dramatically (but not eliminate) their expressive behavior. This points to an impressive ability in these college-aged participants, an ability that spans both positive and negative emotions. The fact that this inhibition was not complete gives credence to the view that emotions may be controlled, but only to a point (Gross & Munoz, 1995) .
3 It is interesting to note that some participants ) Suppression participants were rated as showing more sadness ex· pressive behavior than their no-suppression counterparts during the amusement film. This may be due to suppression participants' engaging the muscles that tum down the lip corners (the same muscles that are naturally activated in sadness) in order to inhibit the upturning of the lip corners associated with &IIIlSement. appeared to be able to inhibit their expressive behavior more completely than others. What determines how well someone is able to hide what he or she feels? Are people who are good at emotional inhibition those who typically express little emotion in their day-to-day lives (Gross & John. 1997) ? Or are they people who use their ability to inhibit emotion in particular circumstances? Given the purported role of compromised emotion regulatory mechanisms in psychopathology. it is important to study emotional inhibition in clinical samples and to see if clinical improvement. whether brought about by treatment or by time. is accompanied by normalization of the kinds of emotional regulatory processes documented here.
Physiology. Because we thought it was the suppression of emotional expressive behavior that led to the physiological changes found previously (Gross & Levenson. 1993) . we expected that inhibiting nonemotional behavior would not produce physiological activation. Indeed, during the neutral film. which produced very low levels of self-reported emotion (and predominantly nonemotional expressive behavior such as lip biting and yawning). no differences were found between no-suppression and suppression participants for any of the physiological variables. This suggests that the physiological impact of emotional suppression grows out of the counterpoising of attempts to inhibit expression against strong impulses to express. Absent a stimllus that produces such impulses to express. inhibition of ongoing behavior apparently has little physiological impact.
When emotional expression was inhibited, howev~ the impact was clear. This included decreases in whatever facial and somatic behavior was associated with the emotional stimllus. Thus. the. amlsement film by itself produced increases in smiling and increases in somatic activity. When participants attempted to suppress their responses to this film. they manifested lesser increases in smiling and lesser increases in somatic activity. Similarly; the sadness film by itself produced increases in sad expressions and decreases in somatic activity. Attempts to suppress responses to' this film resulted in lesser increases in sad expressions and lesser decreases in somatic activity. As in Gross and Levenson ( 1993) .
heart rate generally followed somatic activity. a finding in keeping with. the close relationship between cardiac and somatic activity (Obrist,. 1981) . 4 Whereas the foregoing findings showed some specificity to the emotion elicited, the most striking feature of emotional suppression common to all emotions we have studied thus far (both sadness and armsement in the present study and disgust in our previoUl! studies) is the enhanced sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system. This suggests that suppression of both positive and negative emotions exacts a palpable physiological cost, particularly when one keeps in mind that this sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system occurs despite decreased metabolic demands caused by the decrement in manifest expressive behavior. ' One question that we cannot answer is whether the physiological activation associated with emotional suppression is different in type or amount from that brought about by other forms of emotion regulation (e.g .• amplification. Zuckerman et al .• 1981; repression. Brown et al .• 1996) or by other forms of inhibition altogether (e.g .• suppression of pain sensations. Cioffi & Holloway. 1993; thought suppression. Roemer & Borkovec. 1994; Wegner. 1994 Wegner. ). rowles's (1980 three arousal model suggests that diverse forms of inhibition may share certain features. but we expect there are both similarities and dissimilarities among the inhibition of emotional expressive behavior. other forms of emotion regulation. and still other types of mental work. We believe this issue clearly bears further study.6
Subjective experience. Despite the substantial effects of emotional suppression in the domains of expressive behavior and physiological responding. this manipulation had only a modest impact on participants' self-reported emotional experience. In keeping with previous findings. suppression participants reported lesser increases in amusement than no-suppression participants during the amusement film. Our other finding in this domain. that suppression participants reported lesser amusement than nosuppression participants during the sadness film. was initially puzzling. Howev~ it may underscore the closeness of the relationship between emotional expression and emotional experience in armsement. Even. though the sadness film primarily produced sadness expressive behavio~ it also produced low levels of amusement expressive behavior (see Table 2 ). and the suppression instructions led to decreased levels of armsement expressive behavior and smiling during this film. Thus. our findings suggest that whenever armsement expressive behavior is curtailed (regardless of what the predominant emotion is). there is a corresponding decrease in the subjective experience of amusement.
7
• When somatic activity was used as a covariate. there was no longer a reliable difference in heart rate between suppression and no-suppression groups during the amusement film. F(l. 174) = 1.38. p = .24.
~ Because the films elicited expressive behavior that differed both in amount and kind. strong statements about emotion-specific effects of suppression cannot be made. However. some evidence for qualitative rather than quantitative effects is available if we use the difference between mean behavioral intensity ratings of no-suppression participants and suppression participants as an estimate of the degree of emotional suppression in each film condition. A simple quantitative hypothesis would predict that the effects of suppressing amusement (difference in mean ratings of behavioral intensity for no-suppression and suppression participants = 1.88) should be much greater than the effects of suppressing sadness (differences in mean ratings of behavioral intensity = 0.88). but this is clearly not so. 6 One puUIe is why our physiological findings are at odds with those of some previous workers. One explanation is methodological. For example. Zuckerman and coworkers (1981) found that participants in [he suppression condition generally showed less physiological arousal than participants in the spontaneous condition. but their analyses were conducted using a composite measure of physiological arousal that commingles sympathetic and parasympathetic activation. and they collapsed across positive and negative film conditions. Because suppression appears to have different effects on sympathetic and parasympathetic measures. and in positive versus negative emotional states. it may be that methodological factors are responsible for reported differences in findings. Other differences may be more substantive. For example. Lanzetta and colleagues (1976) found that inhibiting one's expressive behavior while waiting for a painful shock decreased physiological responding. This study differed from ours both in the induction procedure and in the induced state. and it is not clear which difference is responsible for the discrepant findings. One possibility. however. is that pain is best conceptualized as a nonemotional state. in which case this study would provide funher evidence that concealing nonemotional behaviors (such as gross motor activity associated with pain) does not produce the physiological tug of war associated with the increased physiological activation observed in the present study.
Why might suppression decrease subjective emotional experience for a positive emotion such as amusement but not for negative emotions such as sadness or disgust? One explanation stems from the observation that people seem to control negative emotions more frequently than positive emotions (Wallbott & Scherer. 1989) . If this is so. adults would have had many more experiences of disjunctions between emotional experience and emotional expression for negative emotions than for positive emotions. Conceivably. this might lead them to rely less heavily on their expressive behavior when judging their own emotional experience for negative emotions than for positive emotions.
Emotional Inhibition and Mental Health
Our findings suggest that for negative emotions such as sadness, inhibiting emotional expressive behavior does not provide relief from the subjective experience of that emotion. Thus, as a route to the alleviation of negative feelings. hiding one's emotions is unlikely to help one feel better. Of course, this does not mean that restraining emotional impulses (e.g., to yell or to hit) is never desirable. It is in fact easy to imagine circumstances under which it is better for one's own (and others·) psychological health and general welfare to curtail one's expressive behavior. fur example, decreasing displays of depressive affect may increase the likelihood of receiving succorance (Coyne. 1976), and interrupting strings of reciprocal negative affective displays may improve marital interaction (Levenson & Gottman. 1983) .
fur a variety of reasons. there may be times when it is vital to dissociate the emotions we feel from the behavior we express (Gross & Muiloz. 1995) .
Under other circumstances, howev~ emotional suppression may interfere with successful adjustment Particularly when emotional inhibition is chronic. inflexible, and inseI)sitive to the nuances of the social environment it may impair the efficiency of cognitive processing, it may block adaptive action. and it may limit the ability of our social partners to accurately track (and thus respond appropriately to) our needs and plans. In the next two sections, we discuss each of these potential implications of emotional inhibition. Emotional inhibition and cognitive performance. Emotional inhibition leads to widespread increases in sympathetic activation. Such heightened physiological activation has been shown to lead to impaired sensory inta.ke and sensorimotor integration (Lacey & Lacey, 1979) . This suggests that emotional inhibition might diminish cognitive performance. A resoUrce allocation perspective makes a similar prediction. If cognitive capacity is finite, and the inhibition of ongoing emotion-expressive behavior can be viewed as a task that requires cognitive resources, this additional task might decrease cognitive performance. AI-. though we know of no study directly assessing the cognitive consequences of emotional inhibition. indirect evidence comes from a study of behavioral inhibition by Gilbert, Krull. and Pelham ( 1988 ) . These researchers found that participants who were asked to regulate their gaze to avoid looking at certain words drew more incorrect dispositional inferences about a target than did participants not asked to regulate their gaze. The findings were interpreted as suggesting that "individuals may spend so much effort regulating their gaze that they are unable to perform the resource-limited operations that accurate social inference requires" (Gilbert et al., 1988. p. 688) . Although it is a sizable step from gaze inhibition to emotion inhibition. this finding encourages speculation that emotion inhibition (and perhaps other forms of emotion regulation) also might decrease cognitive performance. If this speculation is borne out, this may shed light on the performance decrements associated with mood and anxiety disorders, perhaps caused in part by the cognitive costs of ongoing attempts at emotion regulation.
Emotional inhibition, behavior. and social interaction. Because emotions comprise integrated packages of response tendencies designed to coordinate adaptive behavior in the face of challenge (Levenson. 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990) . habitually and inflexibly overriding these responses may compromise an individual's ability to manage these challenges successfully. Thus. if one is disgusted by what one is eating but inhibits the food-expulsive behaviors associated with disgust. the resultant continuation of eating increases the risk for illness. If the tendency to withdraw from a dangerous situation that is part of fear is inhibited. one may take unwelcome risks. If the anger occasioned by mistreannent by another person is hidden. one's treatment is unlikely to improve.
The last example highlights an essential function of emotionexpressive behavio~ namely the commmication of our emotional states to others. thereby influencing their behavior. Such nonverbal information flow is essential for successful interpersonal functioning. As theorists since Darwin ( 1872) have noted.
we rely on our social partners' emotional expressions to give us information about their needs and preferences. fur example. if we inadvertently anger someone. their angry expression signals the effect of our behavior and lets us know that we should engage in corrective behaviors (e.g .• apologizing). Howev~ if the person we have angered systematically suppresses emotionexpressive behavio~ we are less likely to be aware of the problem and therefore less likely to change what we are doing. In this case. the person who is doing the suppressing may continue to have strong negative emotional responses-perhaps at even greatec intensity levels and with ever-increasing frequency because the unsignaled emotions do not engender corrective behaviors on the part of others. Indeed. this may be one important element of the emotional miscommmication evident in so many forms of psychopathology.
